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Introduction 
It has been widely argued that since the cold war, there has been a shift in the structure of 
international relations from a bipolar to a multipolar system. This transformation has in turn had 
an immense impact on the public policies created and implemented by the EU. In addition, the 
EU’s approach to security has been influenced by the complex processes and outcomes of 
globalisation, which are themselves closely linked to rapid changes in socio-political, economic 
and technological developments. In practical terms, this transformation has resulted in a 
blurring of the classical divide between external security matters such as war, defence and 
international order, and internal security issues such as organised crime, terrorism, policing and 
public order. In other words, we have witnessed the emergence of a new kind of security 
continuum – linking the internal and external security dimensions. Consequently, important 
questions related to who is the main provider of security (the state, international agencies or 
transnational organisations), as well as who is the primary referent object of security (the state 
or the individual) have arisen. There have been several changes in the EU’s approach in 
responding to both the contemporary threats and the present security continuum. Institutionally 
and in light of the EU’s three pillars, these changes have been illustrated by the emerging 
integration of community affairs in justice and home affairs (JHA), along with external 
activities under the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and the European security and 
defence policy (ESDP), and vice versa. One essential change has been efforts to incorporate the 
dimension of human security. The overarching aim of this Policy Brief is to examine the 
possibility of overcoming the internal–external dilemma in the EU’s CFSP and ESDP through 
the promotion of human security. First, the paper discusses the internal–external security 
dilemma and examines the increasingly blurred roles of the CFSP, ESDP and JHA. The paper 
then moves on to look at the concept of human security and analyse the EU security continuum 
in light of this concept. Finally, the paper offers a set of recommendations to guide future 
activities under the EU’s foreign and defence policies. 
Common foreign security policy and the European security and defence 
policy 
For the greater part of the last two decades, the CFSP and ESDP have constituted the main 
policy domains for the EU’s engagement in the fields of safety and security. Through the CFSP 
and ESDP, the EU seeks to promote and maintain stability – not only outside its borders, but 
also in response to external threats and vulnerabilities that may penetrate the EU’s borders. 
Consequently, the EU is often portrayed as a normative power in world politics, being a strong 
promoter of the normative principles generally acknowledged in the United Nations system.
1 
These include the promotion of nine normative principles: sustainable peace, freedom, 
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1 More particularly, this refers to those stipulated in the UN charter. 2 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law, equality, social solidarity, sustainable development 
and good governance.
2 The European security strategy (ESS) adopted in 2003 is a key 
document for EU security policy and the way missions are conducted and prioritised. This 
document clearly outlines a common focus on the promotion of peace, the rule of law and 
development as pivotal elements for the safety of EU citizens. The ESS recognises the present 
security picture as fundamentally different from the past by stating that “the post-Cold War 
environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of 
security are indissolubly linked”.
3 Hence, the EU has taken on a leading and responsible role in 
promoting peace and security – even beyond its borders and immediate neighbourhood. Over 
the years, the EU has been active in a plethora of military, but especially civilian missions under 
the auspices of the ESDP to achieve these ends. Today the EU is present in 16 missions on 3 
continents, and has a substantial amount of personnel on the ground in these missions. The 
missions vary in terms of aims, scope, size and level of activity, and include those on policing, 
the rule of law, military missions, monitoring and planning, and security sector reforms. 
Counting those that are still active, the EU’s total contribution to date entails 26 separate 
missions.
4 With these commitments, the EU is viewed as a normative power, but also (and 
foremost) as a civilian power.
5  
Notwithstanding the high ambitions set out in the ESS and in the public discourses among EU 
policy-makers and member states, there has been widespread criticism of the EU’s lack of 
political strength. Importantly, critics highlight under-resourced missions as well as an absence 
of commitment and political will among member states to contribute to current and new 
missions taking place far beyond the EU’s borders.
6 This problem not only damages the 
strategic importance of the missions underway,
7 it also has the potential to harm the strength 
and meaning of the EU as a normative power.  
The internal–external security dilemma and the EU 
In a world characterised by interdependence as a consequence of globalisation coupled with a 
major shift in the power structure of international relations, the divide between external security 
matters such as war, defence and international order on the one hand, and internal security 
issues such as organised crime, terrorism, policing and public order on the other, is becoming 
less evident. In many ways, this divide has largely become nonexistent. Subsequently, there has 
been an emergence of a security continuum linking the internal and external security 
dimensions. Additionally, and as argued above, the EU approach to security has sought to 
respond to the processes and outcomes of rapid changes in socio-political, economic and 
technological developments. When the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force in 1998, JHA 
matters such as asylum, immigration and border management were given greater attention on 
the EU governmental agenda. Moreover, the further integration of JHA issues continued with 
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the European Council meeting in Tampere 1999, as well as the meeting in Santa Maria de Feira 
in 2000. The appearance of an internal–external security continuum, however, raises several 
important, interconnected issues. 
First, since the events of 9/11 countering terrorism has become the key justification for the 
growing assimilation of JHA affairs and EU external relations. The 7/7 attacks in London as 
well as the Madrid bombings in 2004 further increased awareness among policy-makers and EU 
citizens of the seriousness of terrorism threats in Europe. Counter-terrorism measures are being 
applied by member states to detect networks and conduct arrests, in order to protect citizens and 
sensitive sites. Measures are also being applied outside the territorial boundaries of EU member 
states with the aim of resolving crises and easing frustration and violence in conflict-ridden 
regions. In conclusion, counter-terrorism activities are taking place across a wide range of levels 
and fronts, and perhaps represent the best example of the internal–external security continuum.
8  
Second, and to a great extent as a result of the above developments, there has been an increase 
in internal activities related to border management and control, immigration, counter-terrorism 
and organised crime. In addition, investments and resources are increasingly designated for 
developing new security technologies and intelligence measures that aim at safeguarding the 
EU’s internal security. Instruments that have until fairly recently always fallen under the 
CFSP/ESDP umbrella, are now also used in the name of internal and homeland security. For 
example, the EU’s Joint Situation Centre, which was initially set up to monitor and observe 
common foreign and security policy issues such as weapons of mass destruction, nuclear 
proliferation and terrorist activities outside the EU’s borders, have since February 2005 
incorporated a counter-terrorism unit (CT). The CT focuses on the internal aspects of countering 
terrorism – including the gathering and sharing of intelligence among national police forces 
about persons assumed to be a part of violent radicalisation and terrorist activities, and 
organised crime in European cities and suburbs. More broadly speaking, these are threats to 
social cohesion in European societies.
9 
With the internal–external security continuum, we have witnessed a potential internal–external 
dilemma for the CFSP/ESDP. This dilemma touches upon how security is best provided and 
what role the EU should undertake in this regard. The question is whether to accept following a 
path towards a union that actively seeks to close and safeguard its borders, control its population 
and those travelling into it by expanding surveillance and investing in security technologies, or 
to promote a security policy that concentrates more on enhancing the EU’s role in providing 
peace building, peacekeeping and similar assistance abroad under the pillars of the CFSP and 
ESDP.  
To resolve this dilemma, this Policy Brief suggests that it is necessary to integrate fully the 
concept of human security in the overall EU security approach. In developing this argument, a 
short overview of the concept itself is given below.  
Human security  
The concept of human security can be seen as a response to three major changes in international 
relations after the end of the cold war, namely 1) the introduction of a wide range of new threats 
(or at least perceived as new by policy-makers), 2) a slow, but steady change and growth of 
global norms, and 3) the processes and outcomes of globalisation. As argued above, in the post-
cold war era we have witnessed a significant change in world politics from being a bipolar 
global order to a multipolar global order. This means that we are exposed to a whole new range 
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of threats, including international terrorism, organised crime, energy security, cyber security, 
environmental degradation, climate change, natural disasters, the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction and so on. Furthermore, the international community has seen a plethora of so-called 
‘universal norms’ crystallised in the framework of international law. Finally, these 
developments have been fuelled by the processes and outcomes of globalisation. As noted 
above, the state is no longer perceived as the key (or at least only) referent object of security. 
Other contemporary theoretical and practical approaches also consider individuals and 
communities as referent objects of security. In other words, we have seen the introduction of 
human security in the wider security agenda. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the 
conceptual debates on human security have influenced its efficacy when applied as a tool in 
policy-making. 
The concept itself was coined in the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Report of 1994,
10 and since then its definition and meaning have been widely 
debated. The UN Commission on Human Security defines human security as “the vital core of 
all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and fulfilment”.
11 A more exhaustive 
definition of human security is offered by Liotta and Owen (2006), who argue that “in ethical 
terms, human security is both a ‘system’ and a systemic practice that promotes and sustains 
stability, security and progressive integration of individuals within their relationships to their 
states, societies and regions. In abstract but understandable terms, human security allows the 
individuals the pursuit of life, liberty and both happiness and justice.”
12 Yet, it has often been 
argued that if all components of well-being are included in a definition, the concept will lose its 
meaning.
13 In other words, by narrowing the definition of human security, it becomes easier to 
develop effective policies in practice. King and Murray (2002) include the notions of “freedom 
from fear” and “freedom from want” – two terms introduced in the UNDP’s 1994 report.
14 
Arguably, a problem in finding a coherent and accepted definition affects the applicability of the 
concept to the respective policy-making. It is thus recommended to take a narrower approach in 
applying human security to policy, rather than a holistic one. 
The EU and the promotion of human security 
In a study undertaken by Kaldor and Glasius (2005), it was argued that there are three 
underlying motives for the EU to adopt the concept of human security in the CFSP and ESDP: 
morality, legality and self-interest.
15 These three motives function in a conceptual and practical 
symbiosis, and are mutually inseparable. The first motive for adopting a human security 
approach is based on an assumption of morality. The basic idea is that the EU and its citizens 
are morally committed to helping states, regions, communities and individuals who are lacking 
basic security or are experiencing threats to their security. These are threats linked to universal 
needs and are therefore naturally shaped by universally accepted norms. Kaldor and Glasius 
state that “it may be necessary and should be acceptable, based on the equal worth of all human 
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life, to risk lives in order to restore the security of others”.
16 Second, there is a legal motive for 
the EU’s commitment to adopt a human security approach. Based on the norms crystallised in 
international law, the EU is legally obliged to ensure human security for all peoples, not just its 
own, through its security policies. The contents of public documents and treaty texts
17 indicate 
that the EU seeks to implement the concept of human security through its continuous 
obligations to a legal framework. Finally, there is a case for the EU to adopt a human security 
approach as part of actively seeking to protect its own interests – a point that Kaldor and Glasius 
call “the enlightened self-interest”.
18 In other words, there is a belief that Europeans cannot be 
safe as long as other states and peoples are living in insecurity. Here, the key logic is that as 
long as people outside the EU are exposed to insecurity issues, the EU itself cannot be safe. 
‘External insecurity’ will ultimately affect European democratic values and institutions. Hence, 
insecurity penetrates national borders and is exportable and importable across geographical 
domains. For example, when a society in Africa is hit by a natural disaster or civil war, the EU 
will be substantially affected in terms of (il)legal migration and thriving terrorist or criminal 
networks (or both). 
Although it can be maintained that there are several reasons why the EU should respond to the 
internal–external security continuum, it should be noted that there is a fine line between 
ensuring security for people within and outside the EU (regardless of the motives for doing so), 
and abusing or compromising the civil liberties that are entrenched in the very norms the EU 
seeks to promote and protect. Consequently, EU policies that instead aim at addressing security 
issues by promoting investment in and development of security technologies and surveillance 
and so on could become counterproductive in several ways. They invoke and contribute to 
insecurity, by fuelling the perception among EU civilians that they are constantly under threat. 
Furthermore, these policies can at best function as a tool for combating the effects of a current 
problem, rather than serve the purpose of a solving it. Third, we have increasingly witnessed a 
trend in which security measures have compromised the rights and liberties of the people they 
are trying to protect. It is therefore important that the potential and ambition of the EU in 
countering such insecurities and human suffering around the world is given greater emphasis 
relative to the trends towards securing the territory of the EU with technologies and surveillance 
mechanisms. That being stated, putting excessively high expectations on the EU – which is 
ultimately comprised of 27 different member states – has at times proved unrealistic. Yet with 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and its establishment of an EU foreign affairs minister, 
along with measures to further merge the policies and institutional pillars of the Union, there 
might be a golden opportunity to formulate future EU foreign and security policies in line with 
the genuine promotion of human security.  
Conclusion and recommendations 
This policy brief has argued that since the cold war and the fall of the bipolar power structure, 
the EU security agenda has been shaped by 1) the introduction of a wide range of 
unconventional threats; 2) a slow, but steady change in and growth of global norms; and 3) the 
processes and outcomes of globalisation. These factors have in turn led to a blurring of the 
internal and external dimensions of security, which has had major implications for EU security 
practices. In this context, this Policy Brief offers the following conclusions and 
recommendations:  
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•  If the EU’s security approach continues to develop in the direction of a closed and 
securitized
19 Union, it could fuel the perception of insecurity among Europeans and 
jeopardise the position of the EU as a normative power in international affairs.  
•  The concept of human security needs to be further promoted in the practices of EU foreign 
and security policy. And with the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU is to a large extent 
doing so. Still, the EU will have to tackle the numerous issues of implementing the concept 
of human security with all its aspects, without actually compromising important elements of 
the concept itself.  
•  It will be crucial that security concerns are addressed in a way that they may be resolved 
through ways of conducting EU policies. As the EU has the chance to speak increasingly in 
line with the famous anecdote of one voice, it is vital that what it says is consistent with the 
values attributed to European Union project. With the adoption of a strategy towards human 
security, this may become achievable.  
•  By committing to promote human security, the EU member states need to step up their 
efforts in the civilian missions taking place far from the EU’s borders. A greater 
contribution of appropriate personnel for conducting police and military missions, providing 
development assistance, and offering diplomacy and expertise in human rights, rule of law 
and justice, is desirable.  
•  It remains essential to recognise that the efforts made under the headings of cooperation and 
coherence regarding homeland security should not be discarded. Indeed, these activities 
might be successful in countering organised crime and certain terrorist behaviour, but the 
key issue is to find a balance between policies that can address the internal–external security 
continuum, and at the same time understand the complexity of security issues.  
•  Finally, it is only when the root causes of security are seriously addressed and tackled that 
the safety of EU citizens will ultimately be safeguarded and the internal–external dilemma 
will be reconciled. Importantly, these root causes exist both within and outside the EU, and 
call for a comprehensive approach to ensure that security is achieved. 
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